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International Disaster Assistance in the
Mexico City Earthquake
La ciudad sabe a tragedia,
pero tambien a fraternidad.
Un lector
The Decision Making Process in International Disaster Assistance
Immediately following the first news announcements of the 19
September 1985 earthquake in Mexico City, disaster assistance
from international sources began arriving in Mexico City. Food,
medical supplies, heavy equipment, clothing and other goods began
arriving by the ton at Mexico City International Airport,l much
of it unrequested; most of it untargeted, with no designated
rec ipi ent organi za t i on or group. Simultaneously, international
rescue workers at the sites of collapsed buildings in Mexico City
were hampered by inadequate knowledge of the locale, lack of
appropriate equipment and lack of coordination among the multiple
rescue teams and organizations. 2 Equipment, supplies, rescue
workers and money arrived from fifty-two nations and four
international organizations to assist the disaster relief effort
.
in Mexico City.3 The Government of Mexico established an expert
commission made up of distinguished officials and highly
respected citizens to implement valid procedures for cataloguing
and tracking the disposition of incoming supplies. 4 The
decision-making tasks involved in coordinating the international
assistance efforts and matching them to actual local needs were
enormously complex.
The massive earthquake prompted an extraordinary outpouring
1
of humanitarian international assistance to the Mexican people in
their tragedy. But questions remain. What kinds of assistance,
and how much, were actually needed by the Mexicans? What are the
most appropriate means of getting aid to the Mexican victims of
the disaster? In what ways can international organizations,
operating in concert, take cohstructive action to assist another
nation struck by tragedy?
Clearly the international community acted promptly, warmly
and generously in response to perceived needs created by the
disaster in Mexico. 5 The Mexican Government, in turn, acted
responsibly to set up disaster operations procedures to manage
the rescue and relief efforts,6 and the Mexican people
acknowledged gratefully the care and concern showed them by the
international community.7 Yet, despite the good will, effort and
energy expended by international and Mexican participants, the
actual results of international rescue and relief operations had
a relatively minor effect in lessening the toll of dead and
injured, restoring functional services to the city or easing the
burden of those people rendered homeless due to the earthquake. 8
The comparatively weak ratio of results achieved to assistance
extended compels a reconsideration of the international disaster
assistance process.
In Mexico City, the enormity of the need was obvious to all
who watched the evening news. The availability of resources
time, skill and materials -- was equally clear, documented by
passenger lists and shipping labels on incoming planes and by
2
thousands of volunteers who helped to clear debris, direct
traffic and distribute food and water to those made suddenly
homeless. The problem, however, was the complex one of making
timely and appropriate decisions simultaneously under conditions
of great uncertainty and incomplete information. The inability
of rational modes of problem solving to cope with great
complexity, noted by other researchers,9 was painfully apparent
in light of the enormity of demands engendered by the earthquake
disaster. The sobering question raised by the events in Mexico
City is whether members of the international community will use
this opportunity to
improve their shared
reflect upon means by which they might
decision-making process to achieve a
stronger ratio of results produced for efforts extended in
international disaster assistance.
The Logic of Action in Uncertain Environments
Searching for a explanation of the decision making process
in international disaster assistance, one quickly dismisses the
thesis of events proceeding according to a rational plan. The
degree of error, confusion, uncertainty or omission that
characterized the daily operations of the international relief
agencies during the first weeks following the earthquakes defied
the dedicated efforts of the most professional personnel in
international organizations to order their actions in optimal
ways. Yet, decisions were made; actions were taken, and as the
hours and days of disaster assistance activities proceeded, an
increasing degree of order and rationality evolved from the
3
interaction of participating organizations. 10
Among the international search dog teams, for example, the
initial frustration of not knowing which buildings had been
searched or what buildings offered the most likely chance of
finding victims alive, the wasted time involved in waiting for
needed equipment to move debris, once survivors had been located;
the unwitting clash of technologies involved in the disruption of
silence required for seismic detection of survivors by the noise
of traffic and other rescue vehicles compelled the various teams
to re-examine their procedures of operation. ll
Clearly the members of the various international teams
arrived in Mexico City with no predesigned plan for their rescue
activities. They separately engaged in rescue operations,
according to their respecti ve forms of training and experience.
Encountering difficulties and frustration apparent in the lack
of coordination among their particular efforts to accomplish
their shared goal, members of the teams devised their own
procedures for coordinating their interdependent activities in a
more effective manner. 12
These conditions suggest a different mode of rationality in
operation than the standard administrative model of rational
planning, in which one first devises a plan for action in regard
to a specific problem, then systema~ically carries out the plan
to achieve the desired result. 13 Instead, organizations acted
simultaneously in response to a particular problem. Then,
observing the results against the shared goal of rescuing
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survivors, they redesigned their respective actions to
approximate that goal more closely.14 The evolving degree of
cooperation between the individual organizations resulted in more
effective performance for the set of international organizations
en'gaged in search and rescue activities. It is a logic of
action, reflection upon the consequences of that action, and
choice based upon fit performance. The decision-making process,
employing rationality, is similar to the biological model of
evolutionary choice, which assumes adaptation in response to the
demands from the environment, with adaptive choices made upon the
basis of fitness in that environment. 1S Characteristics of this
model have been recognized in the decision-making processes of
business organizations also operating in environments of great
uncertainty and complexity.16
The Evolutionary Model of Adaptation in Organizational Choice
What is the model of evolutionary adaptation in complex
environmental conditions and in what ways, if any~ does this
model offer insight into the decision-making process in inter-
national disaster assistance? The concept of adaptation is used
by biologists to explain the processes whereby "an initially
unorganized system acquires increasing self-control in complex
environments."l? Examining the process of adaptation in both
natural and artificial systems, Holland states that
adaptation, whatever its context, involves a progressive
modification of some structure or structures. These
structures constitute the grist of the adaptive ~rocess,
being largely determined by the field of study.l
5
The structures undergoing modification display the visible
evidence of adaptation, but successive structural modifications
are likely to reveal a basic set of operators that act upon the
structures. It is the repeated action of these operators upon
the identified structures that produces the observed
adaptation. 19
The model of adaptation is simple. There are three major
components in the process that can be identified for any field.
First, there is the environment of the system that is undergoing
adaptation. The environment provides the context in which
adaptation occurs and offers multiple stimuli and obstacles to
the process. Second, the 'adaptive plan' is the set of beliefs
or conditions influencing structural choices in the environment
at successive stages of development in order to improve
performance. The adaptive plan includes the central values and
intelligent sensing mechanisms that drive the selection process.
Third, 'the measure of performance or 'fitness' of the structure
in that environment serves as the criterion for choice in
retaining or modifying the structures.
These components interact with one another in an adaptation
process that can be characterized by a set of fundamental
questions appropriate to any system. These questions, posed by
Holland, are as follows:
1. To what parts of the environment is the system adapting?
2. How does the environment act upon the adapting system?
3. What structures are undergoing adaptation?
6
4. What are the mechanisms of adaptations?
5. What part of the history of its interaction with the
environment does the organism retain?
6. What limits are there to the adaptive process?
7. How are different adaptiv~ processes to be compared?20
Each of the questions identifies a basic characteristic of the
adaptation process. These characteristics, defined as elements
for a particular adaptive process, can be represented by symbols
which may be used to model the process mathematically. Since the
purpose of this essay is not to develop a mathematical model but
to identify, if possible, an explanatory model for the inter-
national disaster assistance process in Mexico City, these
character i s tics wi 11 be def i ned in common 1 anguage terms.
Corresponding to the seven questions listed above, the terms are
defined as follows:
1. Environment (E): the specific parts of the larger
environment or universe to which the system under study
is adapting.
2. Inpu ts (I): the range of signa 1 s transmi t ted from the
environment to the system undergoing adaptation.
3. Structures (S): the set of attainable forms within
which the adapting plan acts in the environment.
4. Operators (0): the set of means or processes for
modifying structures employed by an adaptive plan.
5. Memory (M): the specific aspects of the history of its
interaction with the environment that the adapting
system retains.
6. Limi ts (L):
process.
the existing constraints to the adaptive
7. Criterion (C): the measure by which different adaptive
processes may be compared to determine fitness within
the set. 21
7
Using the terms defined above, the adaptive process may be
represented by the schema shown in Figure 1. The general
environment generates stimuli that activate an adapting system.
This system is illustrated by the presence of an adaptive plan
that receives inputs from the general environment. The adaptive
plan then selects operators that, in turn, act upon structures
located in a particular environment. This action produces a
performance in the particular environment that is observed and
eva 1 ua ted accordi ng to the cr iter ion of fitness. Feedback from
the performance is returned to the adaptive plan which retains in
its memory a selective record of the event. Informed by the
previous experience, the adaptive plan initiates a new cycle of
adaptation, seeking to improve its performance within the limits
of the operating environment. The process is dynamic.
While the schema depicts the form and flow of the adaptive
process, it is equally important to note the major obstacles to
adaptation. These obstacles, according to Holland, are also
generic, and inhibit adaptation in any environment. They are:
1) size; 2) complexity; 3) interdependence among parameters; 4)
variance in performance measures over time and space; and 5) the
great flux of information from the environment that needs to be
screened and ordered in terms of relevance. 22
The adaptation process depicted by this model is a very
simple dynamic of selection for action, trial, observation of
performance and new selection on the basis of a fitness
criterion. It assumes intelligent actors that utilize
information from observed performance as their basis of choice in
8
successive actions. It acknowledges simultaneous actions by
multiple operators, y-et sorts the effects of those actions into
categories for second stage developmene on the basis of
performance. To what extent is this model applicable to the
international disaster assistance process? If appropriate, the
model may be used to explain the events in Mexico City following
the 19 September 1985 earthquake.
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The International Disaster Assistance Process in Response to the
19 September 1985 Mexican Earthquake
The context and sequence of events following the massive
1985 earthquake in Mexico City offer an apt environment in which
to observe the continuing search for order and an evolving
pattern of improved performance among multiple organizations.
The domain of possible adaptive processes is vast. This analysis
will select two particular environments out of the very large set
of possible environments encompassing international disaster
assistance to observe the interaction among the component
elements of the model in order to determine whether adaptive
processes were operating to improve performance. These
environments, containing some common and some unique elements,
illustrate central problems in the international disaster
assistance process.
First, the environment of search and rescue operations,
carried out by international rescue teams will be reviewed to
determine whether an operating logic of action em~rged from the
conditions of complexity and uncertainty surrounding this
process. This phase of international disaster assistance is
selected for analysis for several reasons. The President of
Mexico, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, declared the first priority
for the Mexican government and its people to be search and rescue
of survivors trapped in the damaged buildings. 23 Further,
international teams generated a high level of visibility and
attention in the media with their applications of new
10
technologies, never before used in disaster operations, to the
tasks of search and rescue. 24 Due to high visibility and vital
to retrospective analysis, activities of the international search
and rescue teams were documented carefully by multiple agencies,
allowing consideration of the same events from multiple
perspectives and various sources of evidence. Finally, several
significant research studies have reported an 'emergent'
cooperation among multiple organizations engaged in disaster
response, especially in search and rescue operations. 25 This
analysis builds upon findings reported in previous research in
its theoretical conception of patterns of organization emerging
from the complex environment of disaster.
Second, the perceived effect of international disaster
assistance efforts, including the search and rescue operations,
will be reported from a survey of residents of the damaged
neighborhoods in Mexico City.26 The actual delivery of
international disaster assistance to the damaged neighborhoods,
reported through the perceptions of residents, offers a valuable
check on the portrayal of the process through media reports,
official documents or interviews with participants or
governmental decision-makers. These two particular environments
of the international disaster assistance process both complement
and contradict one another. To the e~tent that contradictions are
reduced and complementarity increased over successive stages of
interaction between the two sub-sets, the evolution of 'fitness'
or improved performance in the larger environment of
11
international disaster assistance is indicated.
Adaptation in Performance of International Teams Engaged in
Search and Rescue Operations following the 19 September 1985
Mexican Earthquake
Using the model of adaptation outlined above, it is possible
to identify the different components of an -adaptive process from
the context of post-disaster search and rescue operations in
Mexico City. The environment under analysis includes the domain
of international actors only, for although the international
teams interacted regularly with the Mexican government and sub-
units of the Mexican government in search and rescue operations,
the focus of this study is the international disaster assistance
process and its performance in the context of the Mexican
disaster. The impact of the international teams upon the
operations of the Mexican government in search and rescue
activities likely generated a separate adaptive process, but
consideration of that process is beyond the scope of this study.
The specific environment of the international search and rescue
teams generated multiple stimuli and powerful obstacles to
effective performance in international disaster assistance.
These stimuli and obstacles will be described in the
identification of terms for the adaptation model in this context.
The second major component or the model is the 'adaptive
plan' or the set of inputs from the environment interacting with
possible forms for action that determine-the actual choices made
in international search and rescue operations. The adaptive plan
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in this environment includes the shared values of humanitarian
concern for victims of the disaster and commitment to responsible
action demonstrated by all nations that extended disaster
assistance to Mexico. It is expressed, for example, in the logo
of the u.s. Search and Rescue (SAR) Dog Team, "That Others May
Live".27 Again, the specific elements of the adaptive plan will
be described in the identification of terms for the model.
Finally, the criterion of fit performance in this
environment was the rescue of human life, drawing upon
professional standards of organizational effectiveness and
efficiency that were acknowledged by the international rescue
teams, separately and collectively.28
Given the initial assessment that the basic components of an
adapti ve process did exist in the Mexican disaster, the further
elements of the model can be specified. These elements will be
def ined in reference to seven fundamenta 1 terms character i zing
the adaptation process.
Environment
The system under study is the decision-making process in
international disaster assistance. The system itself is nascent,
and although decisions are clearly made regarding the allocation
and implementation of international disaster assistance, the
process by which these decisions are made and the criteria for
choice appear to be evolving with experience in disaster
operations. The larger environment for this system is disaster
management in catastrophic natural or technological events. More
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specifically the tentative system of decision making that emerged
among international organizations extending disaster assistance
following the earthquake was adapting to the wider disaster
environment in Mexico City. The time period under study is the
twelve-day period from 19 September through 1 October 1985 during
which the international search and rescue activities occurred.
Particular characteristics of this environment include the urban
setting of 18 million people, the entrapment of large numbers of
people in collapsed multistory buildings, and the technical
difficulties of rescue operations that required moving or cutting
through vast amounts of concrete and steel debris. 29
Inputs
Multiple stimuli from this environment acted upon the
decision making process in international disaster assistance.
Three types of stimuli, however, were powerful and consistent
influences upon the system, engaging its attention and prompting
its response. First, the media, and particularly the
international press, acted very quickly to transmit news of the
earthquake to national capitols of the world. 30 Second, news of
the catastrophic earthquake prompted an immediate and generous
humanitarian response in disaster assistance from nations around
the wor ld. At final count, fifty-two nations and four
international organizations sent personnel, equipment, materials
and money to assist Mexico in the disaster rescue and recovery
operations. The actual arrival of these personnel and goods in
Mexico both increased the possibilities and altered the
14
requirements for productive action in the disaster environment.
Thi rd, direct obser va tions of parti c ipan ts in_search and rescue
activities contributed a continuing flow of information and
assessment of requirements for effective action. Equally,
reports and response of informed observers regarding the
unfolding search and rescue operations added an important
perspective to the decision-making process. 31 All three inputs
contribute to the transmission of data to multiple recipients
simultaneously and the transformation of those data into
information marshaled for decision support through the common
filter of the goal for disaster operations, saving lives and
assisting those injured, made homeless or otherwise affected by
the di sas ter.
structures
Again, multiple structures emerged in the activities of the
search and rescue operations process. The clearest and most
visible structures, were, first, the search and rescue teams sent
by nine nations -- France, West Germany, Israel, Italy, Spain,
Swi tzer 1 and,· Un i ted Ki ngdom, Uni ted Sta tes and Venezue 1 a. 32 No t
all teams were in communication with one another; not all teams
had the same technologies or strategies in search and rescue
operations. Yet, all teams did share the same commitment to
locate and rescue victims trapped in the debris. Second, the
national embassies located in Mexico City served as points of
communication between the respective search teams and their
national capitols and as possible points of coordination among
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the teams working in the field. 33 Third, the international
organizations -- the united Nations Disaster Relief Office, the
International Red Cross, the Pan American Health Organization and
the Catholic Relief Services, to name a few of the most visible
and/or most active -- offered possibilities for potential
collaboration among national efforts in collective disaster
operations. 34 Each set of structures engaged in disaster
operations and, in so doing, had the opportunity to either
facilitate or obstruct the performance of the overall inter-
national disaster assistance process.
Operators
The means of adaptation in the international disaster
assistance system are primarily those involving communication --
patterns, styles, technologies and language. Since the process
of adaptation in this environment of disaster depends upon the
capacity of the human participants to learn from their own, and
/
others', experience, the form, content and mode of communication
among them becomes the primary set of operators upon the
structures named above. Specifically, this set of operators
includes the informal patterns of communication that developed
between search team members and between the different
participating teams. It also includes the more formal patterns
o f co mm un i cat ion t hat too k pIa c e betwee nth e i r res p e c t i v e
governments through the medium of embassy contacts. Further, it
includes the limited but potentially important contacts between
the national embassies and the international dis~ster relief
16
organizations. Finally, it includes the very limited, but
potentially even more powerful contact between the set of
structures -- field search teams, national embassies and
international organizations -- and the citizens of Mexico who
actually received some benefit through the international disaster
assistance process.
Memory
The interaction among operators and structures in the given
disaster environment is extremely complex. Not all of those
interactions are retained in the collective history of the
process. Memory constitutes the vital record of those events and
experiences 'selected' as critical to performance. These, then
serve as the lessons learned from the interaction. Several types
of experience were vividly embedded in the collective memory of
the human participants in search and rescue operations. First
was the great sense of frustration at not being able to
accomplish their intended goals because of lack of coordination,
organization or facilitation among the separate actors in the
process. This sense of frustration 'was heightened by the
recognition that intent, materials or personnel were not lacking;
rather, communication, planning and administrative skills
appropriate to the magnitude of the task were. 35
Second, equally powerful in shaping the collective memory of
this process was the shared experience of experimentation with
new methods of developing coordination, inventing communications
procedures between participants and pooling information regarding
17
common tasks. Finally, the ensuing satisfaction of improving
performance through cooperation provided an important link
between past and future performance. It left with each
participant the glimpse of effectiveness in collective
performance and the generative commitment to increase this
effectiveness in further interactions. 36 Memory serves as the
stored body of knowledge derived from experience that has been
judged worthy of retention in guiding the decision process.
Limits
Limits to action abound in disaster operations, and a
primary one is the sheer complexity of a disaster the magnLtude
of the Mexican earthquake. The vastness of the search and rescue
task, involving some 954 collapsed buildings with estimated tens
of thousands of people trapped in them,37 presented the search
and rescue teams with an extraordinarily difficult problem for
action. Compounding the complexity was the urgency of time. The
chances of rescuing survivors alive from the debris declined with
each hour, each day of delay in search and rescue operations.
The technologies employed in the search and rescue operations
introduced new possibilities for action, but added new
requirements for field support, information and coordination.
Unplanned, these requirements at times had the perverse effect of
delaying rather than facilitatlng the search and rescue
operations. 38
A third, and powerful, limit on the decision-making process
in international disaster assistance was availability and
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accessibility to accurate, timely and relevant information. This
condition was exacerbated by the severe damage to Telefonos de
Mexico (TELMEX), the Mexican telecommunications facilities, that
virtually closed down all international telephone communications
in the first ten days after the disaster. 39 without ready and
easy access to authorities in Mexico, it was extremely difficult
for decision-makers engaged in the international disaster
ass i stance process to conf i rm repor ts of damage, cor rect er ror s
in perception and make appropriate allocations of personnel,
equipment and materials to facilitate disaster operations.
Fourth, the diversity of languages, technologies and
premises for operation among the different units and levels of
decision makers in the international disaster assistance process
constituted a significant limit on the capacity of the
participants to attain a common understanding of their shared
responsibilities. The unfortunate exper ience of wi tness ing the
disagreement between the French and the u.s. search teams over
the most appropriate procedure to use in locating survivors in
unsafe buildings illustrates the obstacles encountered in the
decision-making process. 40
Finally, the limiting conditions of complexity, time,
information and communications interacted with one another to
compound the obstacles confronting human decision makers in the
search and rescue process. The dynamics of the process itself,
uncharted and little understood by the participants, served to
limit their capacity for effective performance.
19
criterion for Fit Performance
The final element in the model of adaptation in
international search and rescue operations is at once the
simplest and the most important. It is the criterion for choice
regarding which actions are repeated and which actions are
discarded in the continuing search for fit performance. It
represents the logic of action under uncertain conditions and,
very simply, can be defined as "what works" in widely varying
circumstances, judged by highly di verse actors. 41 Agreement on
"what works" is based largely upon the contribution of a given
action to achieving the common goal. In search and rescue
operations, this measure of performance was the location and
rescue of live victims. In the larger case of the Mexican
disaster, this goal was also very clear and very simple to all
involved -- it meant actions to save lives, assist the homeless
and res tore bas i c ser vices. These goals were recognized in the
priorities for action set by President Miguel de la Madrid of
Mexico 42 and acknowledged by all participating international
teams.
A second element that further specified the criterion for
fit performance was th e shared recognition of professional
standards by the participating teams. Although the members
differed in language, culture and technology, they respected the
training, discipline and accomplished performance of their inter-
national colleagues. A common sense of profess i ona I standards
informed their separate judgments of fit performance.
20
The Model of Adaptation in International Disaster Assistance
The seven elements identified above -- environment, inputs,
structures, operators, memory, limits and criterion for fitness
-- present the components of a possible model of adaptation in
the decision making process in international search and rescue
operations in the Mexican earthquake disaster. To Holland, a
problem in adaptation is recognizable when the limits,
environment and criterion of fit performance can be specified
within a given ~ontext. An adaptive system is identifiable when
the structures, operators, inputs and adaptive plan can be
specified within that context. 43 This inquiry will review a
selected sequence of events in search and rescue operations in
the Mexican disaster to determine whether adaptation, or an
evolutionary improvement in performance, did in fact occur.
The Evolution of Improved Performance in International
Search and Rescue Operations
Applying this model of adaptation to international search
and rescue operations, it is possible to distinguish four phases
in the decision-making process that illustrate beginning steps in
the evolution of improved performance. These phases indicate
both increasing control over the environment of search and rescue
operations by individual search teams as well as increasing
recognition of shared objectives'and merit of collaborative
efforts,among the international teams. The process is indeed
complex, and it will be described here only in sufficient detail
to indicate the operation of the moOel.
21
Initial Decision to Send Search and Rescue Teams to Mexico
City
The wider environment in which decisions were taken by
national governments to send search and rescue teams to Mexico
City was characterized by very little information and great
uncertainty. The process also differed from nation to nation.
In the interest of brevity, the U.S. case" will be used to
illustrate the dynamics of the process. While the details
differed, similar conditions existed for all countries that sent
search and rescue teams.
The particular environment in which the United States made
the decisio"n to send search and rescue teams to Mexico City was
one of classic disorder in the midst of enormous complexity. The
first news reports of the disaster in Mexico City had greatly
exaggerated the damage, estimating that 37% of the city had been
destroyed with possibly 100,000 dead. 44 Further confirmation or
correction of these reports was not possible, because
international telephone communications had been destroyed. In
Me x i c 0 Cit Y, the U•S • Am bas sad 0 r con t act e d 0 f f i cia 1 s 0 f the
Mexican government to offer assistance. The Mexican officials
repl ied that they were in the process of determining what kinds
of assistance were needed. In Nashville, Tennessee, trained
search and rescue personnel attending the annual conference of
the National Association of Search and Rescue (NASAR) learned of
the Mexican disaster through televised news reports and
immediately contacted U.S. officials in the State Department,
22
volunteering their assistance in disaster operations. 45 Hours
passed with no further information from Mexico City or
Washington. News ~eports stated that President Miguel de la
Madrid of Mexico had announced that Mexico would be able to
manage the disaster with her own resources. 46
Aware that every hour of delay reduced the likelihood of
finding live victims in the debris, trained NASAR personnel in
Nashville worried about the status of search and rescue
operations. in Mexico City and waited for a response to their
offer of assistance. Finally, the telephone call came from
Washington, late on Friday, September 20, 1986, confirming a
request from Mexican officials for experts in mine safety,
demolition and search and rescue operations. The U.S. would
send a team of 11 personnel with specialized equipment and search
dogs to Mexico City to assist in search and rescue operations.
Members of the team were asked to be ready to leave early on
Saturday morning, September 21, 1985. The team of seismic
detection experts, snake video camera experts, mine safety
experts and trained search dogs with their handlers arrived in
Mexico City at 3:00 p.m. local time, Saturday, September 21,
1985, nearly 56 hours after the earthquake had occurred. 47
Additional personnel arrived later, bringing the total number of
U.S. personnel involved in search and rescue operations to 27
members, organized in six teams.
In this environment of unplanned, unfolding events, a
problem for adaptation is clearly recognizable. The limits for
23
action in disaster search and rescue are time, information, and
the enormous difficulty of the task. The environment of nearly
1000 collapsed buildings with estimated tens of thousands of
persons trapped inside compelled a reconsideration of routine
operations. The criterion for fit performance was the rescue of
survivors.
From this context and the reported sequence of events, an
adaptive system is also identifiable. The structures through
which adaptation to demands from the environment was occurring
were the international search and rescue teams. The operators
modifying these structures were the means of communication among
the different participants: among members of the separate
international teams; between the separate teams and their
respecti ve go vernmen ts; between the nat i ona 1 embass i es and the
Mexican government officials. The inputs to the adaptive system
were, most importantly, the international press, and· the various
media correspondents who reported the events and consequences of
the disaster to their respective national capitals. The adaptive
plan is demonstrated through the concurrent decisions by nine
nations, influenced by information from the disaster environment
and awareness of actual skills, technologies and personnel
available in their respective nations, to mobilize and send
search and rescue teams to Mexico City.
The linkage is tenuous; the messages communicated incomplete
and at times contradictory. Errors were made; yet, they were
corrected and constructive actions were taken on the basis of
24
additional information. For example, the initial judgment of the
Mexican government not to request assistance was changed on the
basis of further evidence, and the next set of actions involved
in actually sending the u.s. team followed accordingly. The most
powerful recollection of this history of interactions stored in
the collective memory of search and rescue personnel was the
number of hours (56) subtracted from the optimal period (72
hours) for life-saving search and rescue operations immediately
following the disaster, due to lack of clarity and order in the
decision-making process.
Allocation of Tasks in Search and Rescue Operations in
Mexico City
Once in Mexico City, the u.S. search team reported to the
U.S. Embassy for guidance in field operations. The U.S. search
team was to work under the supervision of the U.S. Embassy in the
central section of the city where disaster operations were being
directed by the Mexican Navy department of Marine. The actual
extent of administrative support and guidance available to the
sea r c h tea m, howe v e r, was ext remely lim i ted. The U. S. Em bas s y
did provide translators to the search teams, and the translators,
rather than any coordinating administrative personnel, directed
the search teams to the locations where victims were presumed
alive. 48
The initial experience of the U.S. team in field operations
was extremely frustrating. Needed supplies and trained personnel
to support the field teams were not available. For example, the
25
dog teams had no means of communicating between field sites and
the Embassy's disaster operating center, greatly hampering their
work when additional equipment or medical assistance was needed.
The lack of hand-held radios, essential to disaster operations,
delayed by minutes and hours the coordination of equipment and
personnel necessary to rescue operations. The TV camera team had
a radio supplied by the Embassy, but lack of trained
communications personnel at the Embassy made it difficult to send
or receive information. Under conditions where time means life,
the lack of adequate communications facilities between
participating groups and organizations proved seriously limiting
to effective performance in search and rescue operations. The
problem was partially solved, days into the rescue operations,
when an Embassy employee discovered a long-forgotten box of hand-
held radios in the Embassy basement and wondered if they might be
useful in the disaster operations. 49
Oi f fer i ng techno 1 og ies and techniques of rescue opera t ions
conflicted in field operations. The sensitive seismic detection
requipment employed by the group of experts from the U.s. Office
of Mine Health and Safety required silence for effective
operation. Yet, stopping the jackhammers and cutting saws of the
other rescue teams to allow the seismic team to work would delay
the possible rescue of other vict.ims. Recognizing the dilemma,
members of the teams using different types of equipment conferred
and agreed to schedule their work so that the seismic team would
work at night when it was quiet to identify possible leads for
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live victims. These leads would then be followed up by the teams
that could cut through the debris to reach survivors during
daylight hours. 50 These incidents and others compelled' the
members of the u.s. team to re-examine their operating conditions
and procedures.
Several steps were taken to improve performance in the
field. One of the members of the u.S. team, experienced in
emergency management operations, established a separate office in
the u.S. Embassy to provide administrati v~ support specifically
to the u.S. dog teams, but also provided information and
coordination to other u.S. experts in the field. 51 During the
day, the administrative coordinator would meet with Mexican
government officials, secure maps of the damaged areas with
building sites marked that were known to have people trapped
inside, check the status of these buildings for current
information regarding signs of life, identify the types of
structural damage to the building and the supposed location of
the survivors to assess the likely types of equipment necessary
for rescue operations, and assign the teams accordingly for
maximum utilization of time and skills. 52
clearly apparent in theA problem for adaptation was
operation of the u.S. search teams in Mexico. The limits to
their actions were the very real constraints of time, lack of
coo r dinat ion, 1 a c k 0 f co mm u n i cat ion fa c i 1 i tiesand 1 a c k 0 f
systematic information. The envirOnment was chaotic in terms of
administrative operations, difficult and risky in terms of the
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work setting among collapsed buildings in an unfamiliar city.
The criterion for performance was obvious to all participants.
What mattered was the successful discovery and rescue of human
life from the debris. Aware of the obstacles that hindered their
efforts at search and rescue, members of the u.s. team re-
examined their activities within this environment in order to
improve their performance, given the relentless limits of time
and complexity.
An adaptive system is also identifiable in this sequence of
events. The structures engaged in operations were the sUb-groups
with differing skills and using different technologies of the
u.s. team the dog teams, the seismic team, the video camera
team and the mine safety experts. -The operators that modified
the performance of these structures were the informal patterns of
communication that developed among the members of the u.s. team,
as they met in the evenings in their hotel to share information
about the day's activities and to receive information regarding
the next day's assignments. The inputs to the adapting system
were the direct observations of the individual team members and
the reports from relevant organizations or Mexican citizens that
were collected and summarized for members of the team through the
evolving operations center (Dog Base) established after arrival.
The adaptive plan is revealed through the interaction of these
inputs from the environment through· the communications processes
wi th the act i ng structures, the search and rescue teams. Aga in,
the criterion for fit performance drives the growing awareness of
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the need to change the operating procedures and organizational
structure of search and" rescue operations. The adaptive plan
represents the learning capacity of the individual participants
engaged in search and rescue operations, as they assimilated
information from their environment, used that information to
guide their own choices for action, given the resources,
constraints and operating forms available.
A vital element stored in the collective memory of the U.S.
search team regarding these interactions is the significant
improvement they were able to achieve in their performance in the
field with systematic collection of information regarding the
operations sites, readily available and accessible communications
between field and administrative operations and appropriate
allocation of tasks and technologies among the different members
and groups of the search and rescue team. Equally apparent,
however, was the fact that the obstacles to effective performance
encountered by the U.S. team were also hindering the operations
of other national teams engaged in the international search and
rescue process.
Coordination Among the International Search and Rescue Teams
Given the lack of coordination, information and
communication among the different national teams engaged in
search and rescue operations, it is not surprising that conflicts
would emerge over differing technologies and different approaches
to reach the same objective -- the location and rescue of live
victims. Participation in rescue activities surfaced the
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dilemmas involved in the process and resulted in differing
judgments about appropriate technical and administrative
requirements to support international search and rescue
operations. Several incidents illustrate these dilemmas.
At Juarez Hospital, dangerously unsafe structurally but with
known victims trapped in the debris, the French and the u.S.
rescue teams working in different areas of the same site sharply
disagreed over the most appropriate means of reaching the
v ict ims. The U.S. team, mi ndfu I tha t each hour of de I ay reduced
the chances of getting the victims out alive, advocated the use
of heavy equipment to clear access to the victims more quickly.
The Frehch team, mindful of the risk of the unsafe building
collapsing altogether and crushing the victims in the process,
favored a slower, tunneling approach that might delay the rescue
but be less likely to precipitate further structural collapse of
the building. Unable to resolve the dispute, the French team
left the site and left Mexico City the next day.53
A similar dilemma emerged in the use of British military
helicopters in the rescue operations. The collapse of multi-
storied buildings required the removal of heavy concrete and
steel sections of debris to reach the victims underneath. One
means of accomplishing this task was to use helicopters that had
the capacity to lift heavy objects. The British had military
helicopters with this capacity stationed in Belize, only a few
hours away. The request carne from the Mexican government to the
British Embassy for the use of those helicopters. The British
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operations officer in the Embassy made the arrangements for
sending the helicopters with experienced technical crews to
Mexico City to assist in the rescue operations. Disagreement
over the appropriate rescue techniques among the various rescue
teams emerged, and the use of British helicopters was criticized
because the powerful machines would be too noisy and disturbing
to the other rescue efforts. The request carne to cancel the
dispatch of the helicopters to Mexico City. The British Embassy
complied. Hours later, the request carne again for the use of the
helicopters. The British Embassy renewed the arrangements to
send the helicopters to Mexico City. They arrived the next day,
and were sent to a site outside the city. The crews were advised
to await further instruction for their use. Three days later,
the helicopters and their crews returned to Belize, never having
participated in the rescue operations. 54 The conflicting views
and indecision over the appropriate use of differing technologies
in the rescue operations illustrate the extent of uncertainty,
complexity and differing perceptions of the same problem among
the multiple participants in the international search and rescue
process.
Awareness of the cost of lack of coordination and
c 0 mm u n i cat ion am 0 n g the d iffere n tin t ern a t ion a 1 teams was
expressed by representatives of several of the participating
teams. The head of the German rescue delegation noted both the
lack of communication between central operations and field
operations and the organizational problems in performance due to
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a lack of adequate preparation for disaster operations by the
international rescue teams. 55 The leader of the French·rescue
delegation acknowledged the same general lack of organization and
plan for action. 56 Members of the U.S. delegation also confirmed
this observation. While these spokesmen recognized the
tremendous effort, generous good will and professional skills
that individual international teams displayed in the rescue
effort, they also acknowledged the frustrating delays and
heartbreaking loss of vital rescue time due to the lack of
information, coordination and necessary reciprocal support among
the participating teams. 57
The problem in adaptation in this sequence of interactions
is defined by the limit common to all international teams --
time. Working under the extreme urgency of diminishing hours
available for life-saving rescue of victims, the international
teams acknowledged separately the damaging consequences of
conflicting technologies. and inadequate administrative
coordination. The working environment of the international
teams, however, was further constrained by the detrimental
effects of national concerns for reputation. Pride and
commitment to specific technologies by separate national teams
tended to obstruct the genuine exploration of cooperative
solutions to the extremely difficult problems of search and
rescue midst the urban mountains of collapsed concrete and steel.
The criterion of fit performance, nonetheless, remained the
successful rescue of live victims. The low ratio of victims
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found to effort expended compelled all participating teams to
reflect soberly upon their collective performance.
An emerging adaptive system is identifiable in the context
of these interactions. The structures are the nine international
search and rescue teams, operating independently and in
conjunction with assigned departments of the Mexican government.
The operators influencing these structures are the means of
communication, informal among colleagues between the national
embassies in Mexico City, more formal among scheduled meetings
with representatives of the national embassies and international
organizations (UNDRO, PAHO), more importantly, interpersonal
communication among members of different international teams
sharing common tasks. The inputs to this system are the reports
in the media, particularly the international press, which allowed
members of the different national teams to learn how others
perceived their actions in contrast to their own intent.
Tentative, incomplete, a beginning adaptive plan is
recognizable in the spontaneous actions among several of the
international teams. For example, representatives of the U.S.,
German and Swiss dog teams began meeting each evening to share
information from the day's activities, to learn of new sites for
the possible location of survivors and to coordinate, jointly,
their activities for the following day. In another instance,
representatives from a Japanese team of structural engineers,
visiting the sites of.the collapsed buildings and investigating
the effects of the magnitude and intensity of the earthquake upon
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different structural forms, filmed a videotape to record their
assessments and shared this tape with members of the U.S. team. 58
Cooperative inquiry of this kind contributes to the cumulation of
of international data regarding the effects of massive
earthquakes in urban settings. Actions such as these, evolving
out of the common recognition of the need for better coordination
among search and rescue teams and better information about the
structural design of bui ldings being searched, demonstrate the
shared commitment of the participating teams to the collective
goal of rescue of the victims.
Towards the Formation of Professional Standards for
International Search and Rescue Operations
-- .
Engagement in the international search and rescue process
prec ipi ta ted differ i ng ~esponses from i nd i v idua 1 teams, but the
exper ience engendered thoughtfu 1 ref 1 ecti on on the requi rements
for improved performance in international disaster assistance and
generated fresh commitment to design a set of professional
standards in search and rescue operations. The handlers of
search dogs with the U.S. team, for example, have developed, at
the request of the then U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, John Gavin, an
organizational format and set of operational procedures to
mobilize an official U.S. Dog Team for search and rescue
operations in any disaster, national or international. 59 Other
conferences, national and international, have focused on the
experience of search and rescue operations in the Mexico City
disaster and have generated a continuing inquiry into the design
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of an effective process for international disaster assistance,
drawing constructi vely upon the lessons learned in the Mexican
experience. 610 These efforts are tentative, na.scent steps in the
direction of improved performance in international disaster
assistance. They are still in process and have yet to be tested
in actual performance. Yet these efforts do indicate the
powerful capacity of individual participants to select from their
own performance in actual situations those qualities that
demonstrate 'fitness' to the complex environment of disaster
operations and to discard those that prove ineffective or
irrelevant.
The Perception of International Disaster Assistance £Y the
Affected Mexican Population
An important test of the model of adaptation in the
international disaster assistance process in the Mexican disaster
is the perception of that process by the intended beneficiaries,
the residents of the damaged areas in Mexico City. A survey of
728 residents of these areas reveals some interesting findings in
reference to their actual experience with international disaster
assistance. 61 The findings provide a useful check against the
reported operation of the process as perceived by the press,
members of the international teams and the governments they
served. Especially interesting was a series of questions that
appear to show a direct relationship between involvement in
international disaster assistance and information available.
These findings are reported in Tables 1-5.
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As cited in Table 1, the large majority, 563 out of 728
respondents (77.3%) in the survey, perceived international aid to
be very beneficial or beneficial to Mexico in coping with .the
problems generated by the earthquakes. Yet, when asked whether
there was information in their district about how to get access
to this international aid, the proportion responding positively
dropped to 258, or 35.4%, of the respondents in the survey. When
asked whether the information given in their district about how
to ask for, and receive, aid was sufficient, the proportion
responding positively dropped still further to 167 respondents,
or 22.9% of the total number interviewed. The number of
respondents who reported actually receiving aid, either
themselves, their families or their immediate neighbors dropped
again to 76 residents, or 10.4% of the total sample. Those who
reported actual contact with an international organization
engaged in disaster assistance, either themselves, their families
or their neighbors, fell to the very small proportion of 47
respondents, or 6.5% of the total number of cases in the sample.
These findings indicate that, although the large majority of
residents of the damaged neighborhoods in Mexico City were aware
of the international assistance being given to Mexico and
perceived it positively, very few residents actually received
such assistance and even fewer had contact with international
organizations engaged in the delivery of such assistance. Given
the complexity of the environment, the ratio of assistance
received to assistance extended is not surprising. What appears
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TABLE 1
Perceived Benefit of International Aid
"Mexico has received in these last two months (Nov.,
1985), much gratuitous international aid to alleviate
the problems generated by the earthquakes. How
beneficial, in your opinion, has this international
assistance been?"
N Total %
Very beneficial 341 46.8
Beneficial 222 310.5
So-So 62 8.5
Not so beneficial 47 6.5
No benefit 42 5.8
Don't know 14 1.9
728 11010.10
Valid N = 714
TABLE 2
Perceived Availability of Information Regarding
International Aid in District
"Was there information in your district about how to get
access to this (international) aid, if necessary?"
N Tota'l %
Yes 258 35.4
No 433 59.5
Don't know 34 4.7
Not applicable 3 • 4
728 11010.10
Valid N = 691
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TABLE 3
Perceived Sufficiency of Information Regarding
Internatiopal Aid in District
"In your opinion, was the information given in your
district about how to ask for and receive aid sufficient?"
N Total %
Sufficient 167 22.9
Insufficient 253 34.8
Don't know 49 6.7
Inapplicable 259 35.6
728 HH1.0
Valid N = 420
TABLE 4
Reception of International Aid
"In fact, did you or your family or any of your
neighbors receive any aid of this type?"
N Total %
Yes 76 10.4
No 641 88.1
No response 11 1.5
728 100.0
Valid N = 717
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TABLE 5
Direct Contact with International Organizations
Distributing Aid
"Did you or your family or any of your neighbors have
direct contact with an international or foreign
organization that was distributing aid?"
Yes
No
Don't know
If yes, "What" Type of Aid?"
Shelter
Food stuffs
Water
Rescue efforts
Building analysis
Medicines
Blankets, clothing
Messages, communication
Other or
No Response
Total cases:
"What organization?"
N
47
667
14
728
N
1
8
2
12
8
6
3
3
43
685
728
Total %
6.5
91. 6
1.9
HHL 0
Total %
· 1
1.1
• 3
1.6
1.1
• 8
· 4
.4
5:8
94.1
99.9
N
u. N. 2
Red Cross 13
Foreign Rescue Teams 12
Private Clergy, Salvation 2
Army
Catholic Organization 3
Other 6
Don't know 690
Total Cases 728
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Total %
• 3
1.8
1.6
• 3
.4
5.2
94.8
100.0
to be critical, however, is the level of information available to
citizens to initiate their own actions to request and receive
international disaster assistance.
Further analysis indicates that even those who did receive
aid or had contact with international organizations did not
always report that information about international aid was
either available in their district or sufficient to gain access.
Table 6 shows that of the 252 respondents who reported that
information regarding international aid was available in their
districts, more than one-third, 36.9%, found that information to
be insufficient in order to request or receive aid. Table 7
cites that of the 75 respondents who reported actually receiving
international aid, 28, or 37.3% stated there was no information
about aid in their district. More telling, nearly two-thirds of
the respondents, 65.8%, reported they did not receive
international aid and that information about internationai aid
was not available in their districts. In Table 8,23 of the 54
respondents, 42.6%, who reported receiving international aid
perceived information about aid to be insufficient. It is also
interesting that 22 of the 76 respondents who reported receiving
aid (28.9%) did not respond to the question on sufficiency of
information.
Relating these findin~s to the operation of the
international disaster assistance process, it is clear that there
are major discrepancies between the intent and effort expended
and the actual receipt of international assistance by residents
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of the damaged neighborhoods. While there is evidence of
adaptation occurring among the participating international
organizations for the mobilization and dispatch of assistance to
the disaster environment, that process is not yet complementary
to the requirements for requesting and receiving aid by the
neighborhood residents. Yet, in contrast to the theory of
organizational anarchy in complex environments where
organizations are perceived as making decisions only by chance62 ,
data from the international disaster assistance process in the
Mexican case show an evolving capacity by the international
system to modify its form of operations in a disaster environment
based upon a clear criterion of fit performance, specifically the
TABLE 6
The Relationship Between Availability and
Sufficiency of Information Regarding International Aid
Sufficiency of Information
Availability of Sufficient Insufficient
Information in
District Total
Yes 159 93 252
63.1 36.9 60.7%
95.8 37.3
34.3 22.4
No 7 156 163
4.3 45.7
4.2 62.7
1.7 37.8 39.3
Total 166 249 415
40.0 60.0 100.0
Chi Square = 142.592 Sig. = .000 OF = 1
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TABLE 7
The Relationship Between Availability of
Information and Reception of International Aid
Availability of Information in District
Reception of Yes No Total
International
Aid
Yes 47 28 75
62.7 37.3
18.5 6.6
6.9 4.1 11.0
No 207 399 606
34.2 65.8
81.5 93.4
30.4 58.6 89.0
Total 254 427 681
37.3 62.7 100.0
Chi Square = 23.193 Sig. = .000 OF = 1
TABLE 8
The Relationship Between Reception of International
Aid and Sufficiency of Information
Reception of International Aid
Sufficiency of
Information
Sufficient
Insufficient
Total
Yes
31
18.8
57.4
7.5
23
9.3
42.6
5.6
54
13.1
No
134
81.2
37.3
32.4
225
90.7
62.7
54.5
359
86.9
Total
165
40.0
248
60.0
60.0
413
100.0
Chi Square = 7.89 Sig. = .005
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OF = 1
rescue of human life. An adaptive plan, rather than chance,
appears to be influencing decisions made by participants in the
international search and rescue process.
Extending this adaptive plan to the larger environment of
the intended recipients of international disaster assistance is a
still more complex and difficult task. The most promising means
appears to be through increasing the level of information
available to the intended recipients, so that they may also add
their energy and capacity to the evolving adaptive system.
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